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Floor safety at the Shibboleth installation, Tate Modern London



Year: 2008

Paul Lehane1 FCIEH MSc JP

1 Manager Food Safety, Occupational Safety and Licensing, London Borough of Bromley

Correspondence: Civic Centre, Stockwell Close, Bromley, BR1 3UH.

Telephone 0044 (0)20 8313 4216. Email: paul.lehane@bromley.gov.uk


The Tate Modern Art Gallery (London) hosted the Shibboleth installation between October 2007 and April 2008. Doris Salcedo, the artist, created a crack in the floor of the Turbine Hall some 167 metres in length, up to 100mm wide and over 300mm deep in places. During the exhibition a number of visitors were injured falling over the crack.

There are legal standards for the safety of floors in the Workplace (Health Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and general duties of care in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. These are designed to prevent people being exposed to hazards and being injured. In the context of the arts how do duty holders and environmental health practitioners (EHPs) balance practical and sensible risk management against the legal requirements without reinforcing perceptions that heath and safety is unnecessarily bureaucratic?

At Shibboleth, would legal intervention by EHPs have resulted in further negative publicity or could it have been used positively as an example of good health and safety management?

The problem of striking the correct balance between health and safety and art is not unique to the Shibboleth at the Tate Modern; the Diana Memorial Fountain in London was associated with a number of injuries in 2004 and was temporarily closed for remedial works. The author concludes that the Shibboleth installation breached statutory requirements and the Duty Holder should have implemented further measures to prevent people being exposed to the hazard. EHPs should have been prepared to take appropriate enforcement action.

In this paper the relevant law is systematically reviewed and the options open to duty holders and EHPs who face making similar judgements in the future is discussed.

Key words: Environmental health; floors; health and safety enforcement; legal requirements; Shibboleth; slips and trips; sensible risk management.


“I am surprised that health and safety haven’t closed it”

While visiting the Tate Modern in November 2007 to view Shibboleth, the author overheard two visitors discussing the installation. One said: “I am surprised that health and safety haven’t closed it”. When the author introduced himself as a ‘safety officer’ the other visitor responded “But it’s art!”. The response implied that art is sacrosanct and cannot be corrupted with such mundane considerations as health and safety.

However health and safety was important. The Times newspaper reported on 26 November 2007 that 15 visitors to the installation had been injured in the first month of its opening (Times, 2007). This was not the first work of art to cause safety concerns. The Diana Memorial Fountain in Hyde Park was closed for remedial works within a few days of opening in July 2004 after a number of people slipped and were injured (Times, 2004).

The warning ‘Danger of Falling’ was displayed at the entrance to the Shibboleth installation. The warning was necessary because Doris Salcedo, who created Shibboleth had “opened up a long, snaking crack across the vast length of the Turbine Hall, fracturing the concrete floor, her work strikes at the very foundations of the museum.…Gouging open the very ground that we walk on” (Tate Modern, 2007). Members of the public and gallery staff were able to walk on the floor of the Turbine Hall and freely interact with the installation.

Health and safety is presented by elements of the media as being over prescriptive and protective towards minimal risks. For example The Times reported on 5 February 2008 of a pancake race being tossed aside after 600 years by health and safety rules (Times, 2008). In some cases, such as the Shibboleth, it is difficult for duty holders and EHPs to achieve a sensible balance between the expression of the arts and the protection of people from risk. Whatever Shibboleth represented artistically, it was, in reality, a huge crack in the floor.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) launched Sensible Risk Management in 2005 with a view to understanding the issues that appeared to be behind the proliferation of popular stories that were focusing too much attention upon trivial risks and unnecessary bureaucracy and distracted attention from the risks that cause real harm and suffering (HSE, 2005).

This paper considers aspects of flooring safety arising out of the Shibboleth installation and explores whether the arts are exempt from health and safety regulation, and if not, what provision may apply. This is followed by a review of relevant case law and how it might apply to the Shibboleth.

Are the arts exempt from health and safety regulation? 

The arts cover a wide range of different forms of expression presented in an equally wide range of ways and places, so there is no simple answer. The question needs to be considered on a case by case basis.

The ‘practice or presentation of the arts’ are allocated to local authorities for enforcement under Schedule 1 of The Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998 (UK Government, 1998) but it does not follow that all art is subject to health and safety regulation.

What is art? 

It is not possible to give a succinct definition of art and many eminent philosophers have written extensively on the subject. Leo Tolstoy (Tolstoy, 1896) wrote a book called What is Art? in which he developed a series of definitions including:

‘The activity of art is based on the fact that a man, receiving through his sense of hearing or sight another man's expression of feeling, is capable of experiencing the emotion which moved the man who expressed it’


‘It is upon this capacity of man to receive another man's expression of feeling and experience those feelings himself, that the activity of art is based’.

The key to determining whether any particular artistic endeavour is subject to health and safety regulation is to establish if a ‘work activity’ is involved. If there is, then the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 will apply (UK Government, 1974). For there to be a work activity someone has to be employed or be acting in a self employed capacity.

In establishing whether there is a work activity, it is necessary to consider this in its widest sense. Many places, such as at the Tate Modern, are obviously a workplace as people are employed. For example, stewards in the Turbine Hall assisted visitors and oversaw their interaction with the exhibit. The Turbine Hall with the Shibboleth crack in the floor is their ‘workplace’. Although it is the crack (Shibboleth) that is being exhibited, the room itself should not be treated any differently to a more traditional art gallery. Such galleries would fall within the definition of a ‘workplace’ and the Turbine Hall is no different.

In other instances there may be a mixture of work and non-work activity involved in an artistic endeavour, for example, an amateur dramatic society performing in a local commercial theatre. As people are employed to work at the theatre, the amateur production would be subject to health and safety regulation. The theatre is a workplace and booking the amateur group to perform is included in the broad remit of the theatre’s undertaking, bringing with it the general duty of care to non-employees under Section 3 of the Act (UK Government, 1974).

However, the same amateur dramatic society performing the same piece in a local resident’s garden would not be subject to regulation. Residential dwellings are not workplaces – Regulation 2 Workplace (Health Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992) – and there is no work activity being undertaken as no one is employed.

Having established that there was a work activity being carried on at the Tate Modern and that the Turbine Hall was a workplace, further consideration can be given to the specific legal requirements.

What legal provisions apply to the safety of floors? 

Legal responsibilities arise out of civil and criminal law and there are differences between their functions.

In the health and safety field, criminal law establishes obligations on duty holders to prevent exposure to injury. The law is enforced by statutory bodies such as the HSE and local authorities. Breaches of the law are prosecuted in the criminal courts and punishment levied against the duty holder. Victims of slip or trip accidents do not receive compensation for their injuries or financial losses under criminal law although these can be sought through a civil claim.

Criminal law 

The main criminal provisions relating to floors are found in:

Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 

Employers have a general duty to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of their employees (Section 2) and people who are not employees but who may be affected by their undertaking (Section 3) or use premises made available to them for work purposes eg. visiting workers and contractors (section 4). In an ‘arts’ context these duties may be considered as protecting gallery staff (section 2), the public (section 3) and visiting artists (section 4).

Workplace (Health, Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992 (UK Government, 1992) 

Specific requirements for floors are laid down in Regulation 12. Floors must be of suitable construction, be free from holes or slopes and not be uneven or slippery so as to be a risk to health or safety [Regulations 12 (1) & (2)]. Floors should, so far as is reasonably practicable, be kept free from obstructions articles or substances which may cause a person to fall [Regulation 12(3)]. Regulation 5 requires the workplace, including floors, and equipment to be maintained. These regulations only apply to "workplaces”, which means “….any premises or part of premises which are not domestic premises and are made available to any person as a place of work” [Regulation 2(1)]. Some workplace floors are exempt e.g. floors that are in aircraft, locomotive or rolling stock [see Regulation 3(3)].

Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (UK Government, 1999) 

Risk assessments required by Regulation 3 would include flooring safety.

Civil law 

Civil law provides for the compensation of injuries or loss incurred by a plaintiff. There are three common grounds for claims relating to slips and trips:

  • Common law duty of care (negligence);
  • Breach of the Occupiers Liability Acts – Occupiers Liability Act 1957/1984 and 1960 (Scotland) (UK Government 1957, 1960 and 1984);
  • and Breach of statutory duty e.g. regulation 12 Workplace (Health Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992 (UK Government, 1992)

Review of case law relevant to floors 

All the case law reviewed arose from civil claims following slipping or tripping accidents. To date there have been no significant decisions in the higher courts following criminal proceedings.

What is a floor? 

Not all surfaces that pedestrians walk on are covered by the Workplace (Health Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992.

Regulation 12 applies to floors and traffic routes in workplaces. Traffic routes are defined in regulation 2(1) but floors are not. The definition of a floor was considered in the cases of Sullivan (1964) and Campbell (2004). The normal and ordinary meaning of a floor is the lower surface of an enclosed space such as a room but could be applied to surfaces on which people walk or stand. Therefore a floor can exist outside an enclosed space but it would have to be constructed or adapted for people to walk or stand on.

Does Regulation 12 of the Workplace (Health Safety & Welfare)

Regulations protect visitors to the Shibboleth? Regulation 12 applies to those who were employed at the time of their exposure to the risk but does it also apply to visitors? Visitors to the Shibboleth were either members of the public or were there in some capacity connected to their employment, e.g. teachers supervising a school trip.

  • Members of the public. Initially a wide interpretation of the word ‘ person’ in regulation 12 saw a number of successful claims by members of the public including Banna (1999) and O’Brien (1999), but the position was fundamentally challenged in the case of McCondichie (2003) and confirmed in Donaldson (2004) and (2005). In both cases the courts reevaluated the meaning of the word ‘person’ in light of the European origin of the Regulations and decided that it did not afford protection to visitors who are not on premises as a consequence of their employment.
  • Employed visitors. The definition of ‘workplace’ in regulation 2 encompasses employed visitors as it refers to, “any premises or part of premises which are not domestic premises and are made available to any person as a place of work”. It is not necessary that the place used by an employee should ordinarily be used as a workplace; it becomes their workplace when they go to work there. This was explicit in the case of Clark (1998) who tripped over a bag of salt left on a footpath at an unmanned sewage works and was implicit in the case of Campbell (2004) who fell down an embankment. Campbell’s case was dismissed because he could not prove the embankment was a floor, not because he failed to prove that the embankment was a workplace, albeit a temporary one.

Forseeability and the magnitude of the risk. 

Does the risk of a slip or trip have to be ‘foreseeable’ to be the subject of regulation 12?

When considering a claim by McGhee (2002) Lord Hamilton said:

‘The notion of risk imports a prospect and a prospect involves some measure of forseeability. What that measure is (or how in words or figures it should be expressed) may be debatable; but it appears to me to lie somewhere between a prospect of adverse affect to health or safety which is so remote as may be properly discounted and a likelihood in the sense of something which has more than even chance of coming to pass….’

In Marks and Spencer (2001) the court also considered the level of risk that was required to bring the case within the scope of the Regulations. LJ Waller stated: ‘Taking in to account all the relevant factors in this context; that is to say the nature of the risk (i.e. here that the weather strip is by a door, that it is only 8- 9.5 mm high, that it is next to some steps that if the weather strip were tripped over a person may fall down the steps outside the door). But at the same time the assessment would hold that the weather strip was obvious, that it was in a place to be expected, and indeed this lady knew of it and there had been no complaints at all despite the number of exits that had taken place.’

Later he went on to say: ‘The assessment would take into account the nature of the persons who are exposed to the risk. This lady, for example, was 63. The evidence was that she did not always walk picking her feet up, as perhaps she should have done, and the presumption must be that there would be a number of employees in Marks and Spencer such as this lady. But again the assessment would be that persons such as this lady had managed to exit without any difficulty.’

Lord Justice Schiemann stated: ‘In law, context is everything. The context here is a shop, with it being expected that many people of varying degrees of physical mobility, in varying footwear and varying degrees of tiredness and attention, with varying amounts of bags and so on their person, will use this floor to walk on. But one has to bear in mind that these will be people who live, by and large, in the ordinary world, who walk on ordinary roads and who live in ordinary houses and move about in a way that we all do. The sort of slight rise which we have here occurs everywhere. One can hardly move for more than a few minutes without being exposed to whatever threat to health and safety such a rise may be said to constitute. The ordinary person would not…. regard his ordinary walking about in the course of an ordinary day on such a floor as that with which we are presently concerned as exposing him to a risk to his health and safety.’

Marks and Spencer’s appeal against the award of compensation was upheld.

The fact that no previous accident has occurred does not prove that there is no hazard, and this point was made in Brioland Limited (2005). Key differences between Marks and Spencer (2001) and Brioland (2005) relate to familiarity with the floor and the size of the trip hazard. Mrs Palmer (Marks and Spencer 2001) was familiar with the premises as an employee of 10 years, had used the exit on many previous occasions and the height of the weather bar was 8-9.5mm whereas Mrs Searson (Brioland 2005) was unfamiliar with the premises and the threshold was 27mm high. Mrs Searson’s claim for compensation was upheld.

Warning signs

Warning signs were displayed at the entrances to the Shibboleth installation advising patrons of the risk of falling. Their presence was evidence of the duty holder’s awareness of the hazard and therefore that there was a risk of injury. The use of warning signs has featured in a number of cases and the courts have made some relevant comments.

In the case of the Home Office (2004) the court stated that the presence of a warning sign did not discharge the burden imposed by the regulations, or relieve the defendant from liability for the breach of the regulation. It is not sufficient to warn people of the presence of a hazard and do nothing to remove the hazard. Lord Wheatley (Nisbet, 2002) referred to the use of signage in his judgement, saying:

‘When there is an evident and obvious danger then certain duties of care will arise automatically and in effect contemporaneously with the appreciation of the danger. I can see no reason why the janitor should not be charged with a duty of immediately placing any available cones and warning signs around a wet floor, alerting those within the room from the outset as to the danger, as soon as he was aware that the floor was in a slippery condition.’

The judge’s comments in Nisbet (2002) were made in respect of how the failure to warn of the hazard might be reflected in a judgement of negligence and any compensation awarded. In contrast the Home Office case (2004) dealt with a breach of statutory duty and the judge’s comments make it clear that it is the employer’s responsibility to remove hazards and not just warn people of their existence. The presence of such a warning may go some way to mitigate liability for a negligence claim.

How the law might apply to Shibboleth 

Only the courts can give an authoritative interpretation of the law but responsible duty holders and EHPs make initial judgements about hazards, risks and compliance.

When duty holders and EHPs are seeking to achieve Sensible Risk Management it is important to consider the purpose of the criminal law. In McGhee (2002) Lord Hamilton stated that the primary purpose of the Regulations was the avoidance of harm to workers by the taking of measures in advance. This is in contrast to the function of civil law, which is the compensation of people following an accident. When duty holders and EHPs are considering how to address a prospective risk, the imperative is to prevent it and it is a criminal offence to expose people to the hazard, whether or not the harm arises. It is commonly expected, and easier to justify intervention or enforcement action following harm, but not beforehand. It is when duty holders or EHPs take preventative action in respect of risks perceived (by some) as being minimal that the perception of health and safety as being bureaucratic is raised.

Criminal law and the Shibboleth

In the Turbine Hall, where Shibboleth was exhibited, employees were protected by sections 2 and 4 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, regulation 12 of the Workplace (Health Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 ( risk assessments). Members of the public were protected by the duties imposed by section 3 and ‘risk assessments’.

The court indicated in Marks and Spencer (2001) that regulations 12(1) & (2) should be taken together when considering the constructional suitability of a floor.

Regulation 12(1) requires the floor to be of such construction that it is suitable for the purpose for which it is used. The floor of the Turbine Hall is constructed from a power floated concrete which slopes down from the western entrance for about 50 metres with the remainder being level. Without the crack the floor would comply with the requirement as it was of sound construction, had adequate strength and was suitable for pedestrian traffic. However, the crack had been designed into the floor and was an integral part of its construction. It is not something that has arisen from a defect or from wear. Regulation 12(1) is written in a strict sense, in that it is not subject to being “so far as is reasonably practicable”. Taken at its simplest the floor is either suitable or it is not.

Inevitably it will be in determining what is ‘suitable’ that legal argument will arise as in Marks and Spencer (2001) and Ellis (2007).

Is ‘suitability’ influenced by the tasks people are engaged in when walking on the floor? The Approved Code of Practice and Guidance on the Regulations – L24 (HSE, 1998) and a number of decided cases suggest that this is the correct approach to take (Marks and Spencer 2001 and Ellis 2007), so the suitability of the floor must relate to the underfoot needs of the user engaged in activities that can be reasonably foreseen.

Regulation 12(2) deals with holes in floors among other hazards. Floors should be free from any hole that exposes a person to a risk to his health and safety. How big does a hole have to be to present a risk taking into account the foreseeable use of the floor? A shallow hole may be sufficient to expose a person to a risk if it could cause a fall, for example, during manual handling. In the Shibboleth the crack was of such a size (100 mm wide and 300 deep) to present a hazard to pedestrians.

The fact that only a small number of staff were exposed to the hazards or that they had received training and instruction has no bearing on compliance with Regulation 12 (1) & (2). Compliance rests with the construction of the floor and not on other means of reducing the risk which might be argued under regulation 12(4).

Therefore duty holders and EHPs must address the question – “Is the floor suitable for the purpose for which it is being used?” Although Shibboleth was the focus of the installation, the floor in which it was installed was still part of a ‘workplace’ and public pedestrian area and should have complied with statutory requirements. If the Shibboleth crack was in a local shopping mall, the issue of suitability would be easier to determine. It is suggested that no one would accept the floor as being suitable in those circumstances and thus could be subject to a Prohibition Notice as it would present a risk of serious personal injury from falling. Yet we hesitate to adopt this approach to the same hazard and risk when it is presented as being art.

Is suitability related to the number and type of people who use the floor? It must be a relevant factor in determining the likelihood of the risk materialising. The use of any area by members of the public brings a new set of risk factors such as a lack of familiarity with the area and disability (Marks and Spencer 2001). The public visited Shibboleth in their thousands and were therefore exposed to the hazard presented by the crack. Although the number of staff exposed to the hazard was significantly smaller, they were entitled to the protection of regulation 12.

Those attending the Shibboleth went with the specific purpose of seeing and experiencing the crack in the floor of the Turbine Hall. This must have a bearing on the way in which the “suitability” of the floor is considered. However the Regulation 12 requirement that the floor be suitable cannot be met by simply relying on the fact that everyone knows that there is a crack in the floor.

From an EHP’s perspective Shibboleth exposed people to a real risk to their health and safety and therefore breached regulation 12 (1) and (2) Workplace (Health Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

Civil law and Shibboleth 

Breach of statutory duty 

Evidence that a floor was in breach of regulation 12 cannot be used to support a civil claim for breach of statutory duty unless that person was in employment (McCondichie 2003). A floor that complied with regulation 12 and was suitable for employees in a workplace should also discharge an employer’s duties towards non employees under section 3 Health and Safety at Work Act.

None of the cases reviewed involved a claim for breach of statutory duty under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 or under section 3 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, yet both of these provisions specifically afford protection to non-employed persons.

Common law occupiers liability 

It does not follow that a finding of breach of statutory duty will also result in the court finding in the plaintiff’s favour for negligence at common law or under occupiers liability (Mackenzie 2007). There appear to be two reasons why this is so.

First, the statutory duty may not be applicable to that particular appellant (McCondichie 2003) and second, the courts appear to take a pragmatic approach as demonstrated in Jaguar Cars (2004).

If a finding were made in favour of the appellant, then the degree of ‘contributory negligence’ has to be assessed. Each situation is unique but it is likely that the mitigating factors outlined below would carry weight in favour of a higher level of contributory negligence being attributed to plaintiffs.

The courts may consider the following factors as being contextually relevant to the Shibboleth:

Aggravating factors 

  • The dimensions of the crack would have presented a significant hazard. It is not the sort of unevenness that people encounter in their everyday lives. [Marks and Spencer 2001]
  • Very large numbers of people attended the installation and were exposed to the hazard.
  • People were injured.
  • Visitors were members of the general public with all the varieties of age and physical ability that accompanies them. [Marks and Spencer 2001]
  • Public were unfamiliar with the building. [Brioland 2005]
  • There must have been a real risk of people being seriously injured. (High likelihood of serious injury) [McGhee 2002]
  • Natural curiosity predicts that people would try to insert feet into the crack. People do not look where they are going. [Anderson 2002]
  • Risk assessment had identified the hazard, warnings were displayed but no other physical methods to prevent injury were implemented.

Mitigating factors 

  • People specifically visited the Gallery to view Shibboleth and were aware of the presence of the crack.
  • A risk assessment had been undertaken and the hazard identified.
  • Warnings were displayed. [but refer to Home Office 2004]
  • Stewards were employed within the Turbine Hall.

What could have been done to prevent falls at the Shibboleth? 

Was there any reason why standard approaches to trip risk reduction could not have been utilised at the Tate Modern, especially after it was known that people had been injured? The answer should be No, but again the ‘artistic’ dimension of the situation presents itself, as some of the possible interventions would have interfered with the artistic integrity of Shibboleth and the ability of people to interact with it.

The most obvious remedy for a crack in a floor would be to fill it in – but for obvious reasons that was not going to happen at the Shibboleth; however other possibilities were recognised by the Gallery including higher levels of control of entry, barriers or demarcation lines and Perspex bridging over certain sections (Times, 2007).

The Sensible Risk Management debate is not restricted to duty holders and EHPs. Members of the public have a view as they are affected by the decisions taken either because they are injured or their freedoms are curtailed by not being able to do something. Two responses to the Shibboleth debate were posted on the Times On Line website (Times OnLine, 2007) and highlight how ‘health and safety’ can be perceived as unhelpful:

‘It also makes a comment on how people need to be coddled with safety warnings and guard rails everywhere. Common sense severely lacks today. If adults can't be responsible for themselves or their children, they shouldn't leave the house – where injuries can still happen’. Misha, Montreal, Canada.

‘Surely the fact that there is a man stood at the door handing out leaflets reminding visitors to 'watch their step', along with the fact that these people have turned up specifically to see the crack, is enough of a safety measure. The leaflet also asks parents to keep children under control. Anyone who then suffers injury as a result of some kind of negative interaction with the art should really not be allowed out in public.’ Matthew Gay, London.


  • Shibboleth presented a long deep crack in the floor of the Turbine Hall at the Tate Modern. It was a work of art but also a real hazard to employees and visitors. Regulation 12 (1) & (2) Workplace (Health Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992 sets the health and safety standard for the construction of floors with respect to employed persons, while members of the public were afforded protection under the general duty of care under section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
  • Considering all the circumstances of the exhibition, and having regard to the way that the courts have interpreted the law in civil cases, it is the author’s opinion that the floor breached regulation 12 (1) & (2) of the Workplace Regulations and Sections 2 & 3 of the Health and Safety At Work Act 1974.
  • As members of the public were injured visiting Shibboleth, the Tate Modern could face litigation for possible failings under the Occupiers Liability Acts or at common law, but not in respect of breach of statutory duty under the Workplace (Health Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992.
  • EHPs deal with breaches of the law on a daily basis but not all result in formal action such as improvement notices, prohibition notices or prosecution. EHPs exercise considerable discretion and apply common sense with support by enforcement policies and protocols in ensuring a ‘sensible approach to risk management’.
  • There is no doubt that in any other circumstances a floor presenting with a crack the size of the one in the Shibboleth would not have been tolerated, but because it was presented as a ‘work of art’, the appropriateness of the usual approaches adopted by duty holders and EHPs seem to have been thrown in to question.
  • The purpose of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Regulations is to prevent exposure to hazards and subsequent injury. The hazard was evident and 15 people were reported as having been injured.
  • The situation should not have been permitted and other measures to manage the risk should have been implemented by the duty holder. Where duty holders are reluctant to discharge their responsibilities, EHPs should take appropriate enforcement action. It is important to note that EHPs are not the final arbiters of health and safety; this responsibility lies with industrial tribunals and the courts and in contentious situations such as the Shibboleth, these bodies should be utilised more willingly to obtain an independent perspective on Sensible Risk Management .

The views expresses in this paper are personal and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the London Borough of Bromley nor is any criticism implied of any duty holder or EHP involved with the Shibboleth installation.


  • HSE (1998). The Approved Code of Practice and Guidance on the Workplace (Health Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992 – L24. Sudbury, HSE Books.
  • HSE (2005). Sensible risk management – background & research. Available online at: www.hse.gov.uk/risk/ background.htm) [accessed 18/03/08]
  • Tate Modern (2007). Visitors guide to the Shibboleth. London, Tate Modern
  • Times (2004). The Times Newspaper London 28 November 2004
  • Times (2007). The Times Newspaper London 26 November 2007
  • Times On Line (2007). (November 26 2007) Have your say. Available online at http://entertainment.times online.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/arti cle2943217.ece [accessed 10/06/08]
  • Times (2008). The Times Newspaper 5 February 2008, London, The Times.
  • Tolstoy (1896). What is Art? (Excerpts). Available online at: www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361r14.html [accessed 10/06/08]


  • Anderson (2002). William Anderson v Newham College of Further Education EWCA Civ 505.
  • Banna (1999). Banna v Delicato 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 84.
  • Brioland (2005). Brioland Limited v Lydia Mary Searson EWCA Civ 55.
  • Campbell (2004). Campbell v East Renfrewshire Council 2004 ScotCS 81.
  • Clark (1998). Brian Clark v North of Scotland Water Authority ScotSC 2.
  • Donaldson (2004). Candance Donaldson v Hayes Distribution Services and others ScotCS 44.
  • Donaldson (2005). Donaldson v Hays Distribution Services and others ScotCS CSIH 48.
  • Ellis ([2007). Susan Ellis v Bristol City Council EWCA Civ 685.
  • Home Office (2004). Home Office v Lowles EWCA Civ 985.
  • Jaguar Cars (2004). Jaguar Cars Limited v Alan Gordon Coates EWCA Civ 337.
  • MacKenzie (2007). Isabelle Mackenzie v Co-Operative Group (CWS) Limited ScotSC.
  • Marks and Spencer (2001). Marks and Spencer PLC v Kathleen Palmer EWCA Civ 1582.
  • McCondichie (2003). Fiona McCondichie v Mains Medical Centre ScotCS 270.
  • McGhee (2002). Alexander McGhee v Strathclyde Fire Brigade ScotSC 16.
  • Nisbet (2002). Robert Nisbet v (First) John Orr (Chief Constable Strathclyde Police), (Second) North Lanarkshire Council ScotCS 101.
  • O’Brien (1999). O’Brien v Duke of Argyll’s Trustees Ltd SLT (ShCt) 88.
  • Sullivan (1964). Sullivan v Hall Russell & Co Ltd 1964 SLT 192.


  • UK Government (1957). Occupiers Liability Act 1957, Chapter 31.
  • UK Government (1960). Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, Chapter 30. UK Government (1974). Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, Chapter 37.
  • UK Government (1984). Occupiers Liability Act 1984, Chapter 3. UK Government (1992). Workplace (Health, Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992, SI No.3004.
  • UK Government (1998). Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998, SI No. 494.
  • UK Government (1999). Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, SI No. 3242.